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ABSTRACT
In
1879 the buffalo disappeared from the Canadian
North-West, leaving the Plains Indians in an extreme state
In accordance with its treaty commitments
to the Indians, the federal government undertook the respons-
ibility of feeding the Indians of Treaties Four, Six and
Seven . The government, in addition, introduced the reserve
agricultural program, which it was hoped would transform the
Indians into a self-supporting agrarian people . While the
initial costs of rationing the Indians and assisting them in
farming operations were high, it was hoped that within a few
years the government would be largely relieved of such ex-
penditures .
In spite of the promising early returns made on reserves
in the early 1880's the agricultural program did not succeed
quickly enough to suit the government . One of the major reas-
ons for the delay of the program was in fact the government's
preoccupation with maintaining economy in Indian administra-
tion at all costs . ,then the government undertook a general
reduction of expenditures on Indian administration in the
North West in 1833, any possibility of the reserve agricult-
ural program succeeding was ended .
The actions of various Indian bands and leaders in the
North vWest during these years were characterized by a desire
to achieve suitable terms which would permit their people to
make the transition to the farming way of life . The general
cutbacks in spending introduced in 1883, however, sparked the
formation of an Indian political movement seeking improved
conditions . This movement grew rapidly, and likely would have
unified Indians from all sections of the North-West in insist-
ing upon the renegotiation of the treaties during the summer
of 1885, had the Metis not rebelled . Although Indian partic-
ipation in the North-West Uprising of 1885 was limited, it
prompted the adoption of a policy of repression by the govern-
ment in dealing with the Indians . The plan of assisting the
Indians in becoming self-sufficient farmers was forgotten,
and they became the charges of the Department of Indian Affairs .
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PREFACE
On July 15th, 1870, the Dominion of Canada formally
took possession of Rupert's Land and the North-West terr-
itory from the Hudson's Bay Company . The annexation of this
territory marked the completion of one of the common goals
agreed upon four years earlier in the federation of the
Canadas, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick . The transfer of this
vast area, however, was only the first step in the integra-
tion of the North-West into the Dominion . The lengthy and
difficult task of settling and developing the various regions
of the North-West was to consume a major part of the young
country's energies in the coming years .
The gravest problem encountered in the settlement of
the North-West Territories between 1870 and 1890 involved
relations between the native Indian tribes and the steadily
increasing white population . During this twenty year period
the North-nest underwent a tremendous transformation . The
region that in 1871 had been popularized as "The Great Lone
Land" had by 1890 been connected by rail with both the At-
lantic and Pacific Oceans . The plains that twenty years
earlier had been inhabited by magnificent herds of buffalo,
were by 1890 dotted with growing settlements . In less than
two decades the nomadic way of life of the Plains Indians
had been terminated .
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The relationship between Indians and whitemen in the
North-West Territories in the twenty years after 1870 was
significantly different from previous experiences in either
Eastern Canada or the American West . The degree of involve-
ment entered into by the federal government in aiding the
transition of the Plains Indians from a nomadic to a sedent-
ary agricultural way of life was unlike anything that had
happened previously in the administration of Indian affairs
in British North America . Moreover, the violence and blood-
shed that characterized the settlement of the American West
was for the most part avoided in the Canadian North-West
.
The course of Indian administration in the North-West Terr-
itories was shaped by the peculiar political, social and
ecological development of that area .
The purpose of this study is to examine the actions of
the federal government in providing aid to the Indians of
the North-West Territories following the disappearance of
the buffalo in 1878-1879 . What the government proposed was
to transform the Indians in Treaties Four, Six and Seven into
self-sufficient farmers . While it was hoped that this could
be accomplished in a matter of a few years, the government in
the meantime unwillingly undertook the expense of feeding
these Indians. To understand the successes and failures of
this program, and the growth of Indian agitation prior to
1885, it is necessary to investigate the administration of
federal aid to the Indians included in these treaties .
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CHAPTER ONE
THE OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP
Within a year of the acquisition of the North-West,
the Canadian government was actively engaged in the admin-
istration of Indian affairs in the new territory
. 1 Luring the
summer of 1871
the first Indian treaties entered into by the
Dominion government were negotiated with the tribes of the
eastern section of . the territory . By 1877 the government had
concluded seven such treaties, involving virtually all tribes
between the Lake of the '
:goods and Lake Winnipeg on the east
and the Rocky Mountains to the west .
Throughout these early years the federal Indian branch
made considerable efforts to gather information concerning
the nature of the North West and its native inhabitants . As
late as 1878 David Mills, the Minister of the Interior, 2 noted
that "the amount of information in reference to the Indians
of the N .W .T . is extremely scanty, and every agent and public
officer should lose no opportunity of obtaining all he can
and of furnishing it to this Department! , .' 3 Information came
into the Department from a wide range of sources, including
Hudson's Bay Company officials, missionaries, Indian Branch
employees and travellers . Among the many reports received
from these sources, there were two especially interesting
descriptions of the Indians of the North-West : Lieutenant
1
Butler's report of his journey across the territory in the
winter of 1870-1871, and a memorandum submitted. t o
the
Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories in 1875
by an Oblate missionary, Father Lacombe . 5
Father Ls.combe's memorandum was based on more than
twenty years residence among the Indians of the Saskatchewan
Valley . In the memorandum he divided the Indians of the
Tozth--'.'lest into three main groups . The first group consisted
of the Cree and Saulteaux tribes, whose language and customs,
noted Lacombe, were quite similar . The Plains Cree and the
Saulteaux occupied the area around the worth Saskatchewan
Liver and part of the area above the South Saskatchewan River .
There were also Wood Cree, Swampy Cree and Ojibwa to the north
and the east .
The second group listed by Lacombe was the Assiniboirn
tribe, or the Stoney Indians, as they were otherwise known .
The Assiniboir_ ranged from the valley of the South Saskatche-
wan Liver as far north as the North Saskatchewan, west to the
Rocky Lountains and southwest to the Bow Liver . Linguistically
they were sirr=_1 r to the Sioux, though distinct from the Cree
an -;d
	
They had lived in peace, however, for many
years with tLeii neighbours to the north .
The thi -d :coup, the Blackfoot or "les hommes de la prairie",
was divided into three bands . The Blackfoot proper, lived in
the valley the Labiche River . The Blood Indians occupied
the area be .ween the Labiche and the Dow Livers . The third
2
band, the Piegans ranged between the Belly and Missouri Rivers .
As well as these three main bands, which shared a common Black-
foot language, there was a small fourth tribe, the Sarcees .
The Sarcees had 'many years before' come from the Peace River
area by foot to the plains where they had united with the
Blackfoot . From time immemorial, related Lacombe, the Black-
foot nation had been at war with its neighbours, and had gained
a great reputation for barbarism and thievery .
Lieutenant Butler's description of the Indians of the
North-West was based upon geographic and economic consider-
ations rather than those of linguistic affiliation . For the
purpose of Indian administration in subsequent years, the
Canadian government for the most part utilized the classifi-
cation outlined by Butler . In his report Butler suggested
that the Indians could be divided into two categories . The
first Croup, which he called the "Thickwood Indians", included
the 'moods and Swampy Cree, the Stonies of Rocky Mountain House,
and the Saulteaux, or Plains Ojibwa . For the most part these
people depended on fishing and the hunting of deer and moose
for their livelihood . Generally they were organized into
small bands .
The second group Butler called the "Indians of the Prairie" .
This group consisted of the Assiniboin at Qu'Appelle, the
Plains Cree and the different tribes in the Blackfoot Confed-
eracy . The way of life shared by these Indians was marked
by an almost entire dependence on the buffalo . I.Toreover, their
3
chronic participation in intertribal warfare had encouraged
more sophisticated and complicated forms of leadership in
their society than were found among the "Thickwood Indians" .
There was a good deal of discrepancy in various estim-
ates of the native population of the North-West . The report
of the Palliser Expedition, which was based on the exploration
of this vast area between 1857 and 1860, had placed the Indian
population at 28,510 . 6 Lieutenant Butler in 1871 estimated
the population at slightly less than 17,000 . 7 A "Census of
the Districts of the North-West Territories" prepared for the
Department of the Interior by the Hudson's Bay Company placed
the native population at about 9,700 as of January 1st, 1872 . 8
This last figure was close to the estimate of 9,340 submitted
by Father Lacombe in 1875 . 5
By 1881, however, the government had more accurate stat-
istics for the native population of the North-West Territor-
ies . 10 The report of the Department of Indian Affairs for
1882 revealed that as of December 31st, 1881, there were some
26,050 treaty, non-treaty and Sioux Indians resident in the
North West .
11
While several factors might be advanced to
explain the extreme conservatism of earlier estimates, 12 the
fact remained that the Canadian government was dealing with
a considerably larger number of natives in the North-West
Territories than it had been led to believe . This early con-
fusion regarding the size of the Indian population clouded the
government's conception of the magnitude and expense involved
4
in Indian administration in the North-Vest on several occas-
ions in the following years . 13
From the various reports received-by the government it
was also evident that during the 1870's the North-West
Territories was in a state of turmoil . Lieutenant-Governor
Archibald, in his instructions to Lieutenant Butler, commis-
sioning his journey across the plains in the winter of 1870-
1871, observed that, "Representations have been made from
various quarters that within the last two years much disorder
has prevailed in the settlement along the line of the Saskat-
chewan, and that the local authorities are utterly powerless
for the protection of life and property within that region ."f
14
Lieutenant Butler's Report confirmed these representations :
As matters at present rest, the region of the
Saskatchewan is without law, order, or security
for life or property : robbery and murder for
years have gone unpunished ; Indian massacres
have gone unchecked even in the close vicinity
of Hudson's Bay Company posts, and all civil
15
and legal institutions are entirely unknown .
Butler indicated that the recent increase in disorder in
the North-West was directly related to the loosening of the
Hudson's Bay Company's control over the area . In the past
the Hudson's Bay Company had exercised considerable authority
in tree region . As the employees of the Company had been
virtually the only white men in contact with the Indians,
the natives had tended to associate the technological trap-
pings of white civilization found in the various Company
posts with individual officers . Company employees had carefully
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nurtured this respect in order to facilitate the fur trade .
Since the 1820's the Company had provided a paternalistic
form of government for the territory .
In the 1860's and 1870's, however, the Hudson's Bay
Company's monopoly over the fur trade in the North-West was
challenged by American trading interests . The trail of the
free traders stretched from Fort Benton on the T~lissouri to
Fort Edmonton on the North Saskatchewan . With the advent of
the free traders into the North-Vtest, the Indians quickly
formed less favourable views of the whiteman's nature .
Lieutenant Butler described the activities of the free
traders as being fundamentally short-sighted . Their aim was
to accumulate the maximum number of furs and buffalo robes
at the least expense on each expedition. Essential to their
operations was the practice of trading liquor for buffalo
robes, a practice the Hudson's Bay Company had long since
dispensed with .
16
According to the Reverend George Tv_cDougall,
a ;Methodist missionary, some fifty thousand buffalo robes had
been obtained in this manner in
1873 .17
Though many Indians
expressed the desire to end the whisky trade they often
found themselves unable to resist the temptation of liquor .
18
During these years there were innumerable reports of drunken
brawls, beatings and killings among Indians unable to cope
with the whiteman's "firewater" .
In addition to their unscrupulous use of liquor in the
fur trade, the free traders also took every opportunity to
engender in the Indians bitterness towards the Hudson's Bay
6
Company . As a result, the Hudson's Bay Company in the 1860's
found itself unable to exercise repressive powers in the
plains region even if it had been willing to do so, to the
detriment of its commercial interests . In reality the cession
of Rupert's Land and the North-West territory in 1870 had re-
lieved the Hudson's Bay Company of the uncomfortable burden
of pretending to govern the area .
Equally distressing for the Indians was the tremendous
pressure exerted on the buffalo herds by the arrival of white
traders and hunters seeking buffalo robes for eastern markets .
One observer summarized the situation in the following manner :
On the south are the Americans, on the east
the Sioux, the Assiniboines [sic], the Cree and
the halfbreeds from Fort Pitt, Whitefish lakes,
Victoria, Edmonton and Big Lake, on the west
sides of the Rocky Mountains and from them come
several small tribes of Indians . . . .
When it is remembered that the Plains Indians
live on buffalo alone it may be se n at a glance
where this slaughtering will end . 1 9
The gradual disappearance of the buffalo resulted in an in-
creasing incidence of starvation among the Plains Indians .
Butler noted that in travelling from the Red River to the
Rocky Iviountains he had not encountered a single buffalo . The
Indians were not slow to attribute this steady reduction in
the numbers of the buffalo to the advent of white hunters
and traders .
The Plains Indians' contact with white men was not, how-
ever restricted to Hudson's Bay Company employees and free
traders . During this period small parties of miners and
7
8surveyors entered the North-West Territories . Often these
groups showed little restraint in their dealings with the
Indians . Surveyors, laying out the reservations around the
Hudson's Bay Company posts in the winter of 1873-1874,
were
reported to have made the Indians very angry .
20
Yet in the
long run, the most important group of white men coming into
the North-West were the settlers . Though relatively few
settlers came into the area in the 1870's, nevertheless, they
were the advance guard for the great numbers of settlers who
would one day turn the plains into a vast farming region . The
prospect of western settlement understandably made the Indians
more unsure of their future . As one observer paradoxically
concluded,
. . . the Indians are generally . ., well disposed
towards white people, and would have no objec-
tion to their settling on the land and cultivat-
ing it, if in doing so they did not encroach or,
the Indian hunting grounds .
21
The impossibility of such an arrangement being maintained
was to become all too apparent in the coming years .
Another source of Indian discontent was the treatment
accorded Indian tribes south of the Boundary Line . Bands
of Piegans, Blackfoot and Bloods, which regularly travelled
south of the Line in search of buffalo, on several occasions
found themselves victims of a war of extermination being
undertaken by the United States army to clear the region for
settlement . 22 One example was that of an attack carried out
by the United States army in the summer of 1870 against a
band of Canadian Piegans camped south of the border . Although
the camp was suffering from a small-pox epidemic, one hundred
and seventy men, women and children were wiped out by the
Americans . 23 Incidents such as this, though they occurred on
American soil, cast a shadow over Indian-white relations in
the North-West Territories which remained throughout the
1870's and early 1880's
. 24
The Canadian government's treatment of Indians in the
North-West Territories was based on the assumption that
that area would soon be thrown open for settlement . One of
the first steps taken was the creation in 1873 of a corps
of mounted riflemen known as the North-West Mounted Police
for the establishment of law and order and federal supervis-
e
ion of the North-blest . ' The need for such a police force
in the North-`lest had been outlined in the reports of
Lieutenant Butler and Colonel Robertson Ross . 26 Butler had
suggested that a force of one hundred and fifty men would
be necessary in order to eliminate the obnoxious whiskey
trade, an obvious starting point if law and order was to be
introduced into the region. While Robertson Ross granted the
necessity of ending the whiskey trade, he also envisioned the
supervision of Indians as being one of the major responsibil-
ities of such a police force . Robertson Ross plainly
cangi4. -
ered the Indians a barrier to the agricultural settlement of
the Porth-West :
Indeed, the white men dwelling in the Saskatche-
wan are at this moment living by sufferance, as it
were, entirely at the mercy of the Indians . They
a
dare not venture to introduce cattle or stock
into the country, or cultivate the ground 2~o
any extent for fear of Indian spoilation .
It was generally recognized that the North-West Mounted
Police would be quite different in nature than the American
military authorities operating south of the border . Unlike
the American West, the North-West Territories of Canada was
virtually unsettled during the 1870's . The tremendous ratio
of native population to white population made it obvious
that if the Mounted Police were to establish order in the
region, it was essential that the force receive co-operation
from the Indians . From the time of the entry of the force
into the North-West in 1874, its dealings with the Indians
were characteristically marked with restraint . The size of
the force - initially numbering three hundred officers and
men - ensured that the Mounted Police would act as policemen
rather than soldiers .
28
Nevertheless, the Mounted Police played a major role in
the administration of Indian Affairs in the two decades fol-
lowing 1870 . Mounted Police escorts accompanied government
commissioners in the negotiation of both Treaties Six and
Seven . e9 In addition, the Mounted Police carried out annuity
payments in some regions of the North-West throughout the
1870's . In spite of their small numbers, the North-West
Mounted Police were confident of their ability to restrain
the Indians of the North-West . On several occasions various
officials of the Department of Indian Affairs advocated the
use of the Mounted Police as a coercive force to be used in
1 0
pressing the Indians into accepting conditions otherwise
unpalateable to them .
30
But the establishment of the North-West Mounted Police
was merely the first step in the Canadian government's devel-
opment of the North-West
. At an early date it was apparent
that the future settlement of the region would depend largely
on the Canadian government's ability to achieve a workable
arrangement with the Indian population
. The management of
Indian affairs in the North-West involved a number of diffi-
culties quite different from anything previously experienced
in British North America . It was anticipated that the North-
West would be settled in a matter of a few decades . Diffi-
culties arising from Indian-white contact had in the East been
gradually worked out over two centuries . The Indians of the
North-Wi's'est had only twenty years in which to adjust themselves
to an entirely new way of life . T,oreover, the culture of the
Plains Indians, based as it was on the buffalo, was to undergo
a transformation more rapid and more complete than any other
Native population in British North America . The experience
of the American `Nest had proven that the continuation of a
nomadic hunting economy was impossible in areas capable of
supporting agricultural communities .
The negotiation of treaties between the Canadian govern-
ment and the various tribes in the North-West served two
purposes . First, the treaties brought the Indians into an
official relationship with the government . By identifying
1 1
the Indians as 'Subjects of the Queen', the treaties form-
ally brought the Indians under the jurisdiction of the
Dominion of Canada . In defining the position of the Indians
vis a vis the government a further move was made towards the
introduction of the rule of law into the North West . Hence-
forth the Indians were to be subject to Canadian law, British
justice, and the North-West Mounted Police .
The treaties also provided some idea of the position
that the Canadian government expected the Indians to assume
in the new agricultural society to be established in the
North-West . Through the treaties the Indians were to surrender
their aboriginal land title to the region, thus enabling the
development of settlement . In return the Canadian government
undertook the responsibility of providing some assistance to
the Indians in adapting to an agrarian sedentary society . It
was hoped that in the future the Indians might achieve self-
sufficiency through agricultural pursuits .
31
While it was commonly believed in Canadian government
circles that the Indians of the North-West were anxious to
enter into treaties with the Dominion it did not seem to be
understood that the Indians had a rather different idea of
the purpose of the treaties than did the whiteman . There
is little doubt that the Indians were in favour of reaching
some agreement with the Canadian government which' would re-
store order in the North West during this troubled period .
During the negotiation of Treaty Seven, one chief expressed
1 2
this sentiment :
Before the arrival of the Police, when I laid
my head down at night, every sound frightened
me ; my sleep was b~gken ; now I can sleep sound
and am not afraid .
Whether or not the Indians were in favour of, or even under
stood the future implications of the treaties is not clear .
33
It would seem that a good number of Indians, at the time of
the negotiation of the treaties, were primarily concerned
with the immediate implications of achieving a formal rela-
tionship with the Canadian government .
From the point of view of the Canadian government there
were two modes by which treaties might be negotiated with the
Indians of the North-West Territories . The alternative
approaches were summarized by Indian Commissioner Provencher
in his report to the Secretary of State .
Treaties may be made with them simply with
a view to the extinction of their rights,
by agreeing to pay them a sum, and after-
wards abandon them to themselves . On the
other side, they may be instructed, civil-
ized and led to a mode of life more in
conformity with the new position of this
country, and accordingly make them good,
industrious and useful citizens .
Under the first system the Indians will
remain in their condition of ignorance and
inferiority, and as soon as the facilities
for hunting and fishing disappear, they
will become mendicants, or be obliged to
seek refuge in localities inaccessible to
immigration or cultivation .
Under the second system, on the contrary,
they will learn sufficient for themselves,
and to enable them to pass from a state of
tutelage, and tQ do without assistance from
the government .i4
In fact, there was little question but that the government
1 3
would accept Provencher's second alternative . The inanity
of attempting to settle a region in which no provision had
been made for the future maintenance of the Indians had
been amply demonstrated south of the border .
The government received advice from a number of quar-
ters regarding the most advantageous method of assisting the
Indians during the coming period of transition . By and large
it was agreed that the government should take some steps to
preserve the dwindling buffalo herds . Father Lacombe optim-
istically predicted that if stringent measures were taken
the buffalo might be preserved indefinitely for the use of
the Indians . 35 Though other observers warned that the
buffalo would probably aisappear within five years, 36 it
was generally accepted that efforts taken to preserve the
game in these last years would at least ease Indian-white
relations . Another idea put forward was that the government
might supply fishing nets to encourage the Indians to take
advantage of the fish found in the rivers and lakes of the
Borth=Nest Territories . 37
One of the most ingenious plans submitted to the gov-
ernment came from Charles Bell, who in later years headed
the Geological Survey of Canada . 38 Bell suggested that the
territories of the various tribes be formed into large temp-
orary reservations, taking in the hunting grounds as they
were at present and keeping them until such time as the game
disappeared . Bell predicted with amazing accuracy that the
buffalo would disappear by 1879 ; at that time the smaller
1 4
final reserves could be given to the Indians . Bell did not
believe that the settlement of the North-West would be
seriously retarded if settlers were kept out of the tempor-
ary reservations for five years .
It was also suggested that in districts where the
buffalo had already been completely exterminated domestic
cattle might be introduced whereby the Indians could be
provided an unlimited supply of food . 39 The rich pasturage
of the country, untouched in recent years, could be used to
maintain these herds, which, it was hoped, might be thoroughly
acclimatized within a few years . In this way, the Plains
Indians would gradually adapt to raising cattle for their
living, as they had previously raised horses for hunting
purposes . 40
It was also proposed that in lieu of paying the Indians
annuities, an emergency fund be created . 41 This fund could
be used to assist the Indians in times when the hunt failed,
or when there was no other work available for them . As early
as 1874, it was obvious to some people that there would come
a time when the Indians would need extensive government
assistance . For others such as IPIr . ivieredith, the Deputy
Minister of the Interior, "the great aim and object of Indian
policy would be to teach the Indians the habits of industry
and self-reliance and to prevent them from becoming a perman-
ent state pauper, a perpetual tax on the country and an
obstacle in the way of all improvement ."42 Meredith also
advocated that the Indian's services as guides be fully
1 5
utilized by the Mounted Police, the surveys and the railways .
The most important aspect for the Canadian government
to bear in mind in its future dealings with the Indians of
the North-West, in Father Lacombe's opinion, was that it
consider itself as the father and teacher of all Indian
tribes . 43 In order to prevent more of the misery which had
beset Indian-white relations so often in the past, Lacombe
deemed it essential that the government adopt an attitude
of paternalism that would allow it to act as the protector
of 'the disinherited of nature' . Lacombe also took the
opportunity to recommend that it might be wise to employ
missionaries in dealing with the Indians .
While the individual proposals outlined above present-
ed the government with several different approaches, in the
end, the basic structure of the treaties negotiated with the
Plains Indians was determined by the government's previous
experience in making treaties in the eastern section of the
North-West Territories . Treaties One, Two and Three had con-
tained a government commitment for 'instructing and civil-
izing' the Indians by attaching them to agriculture . At the
same time, the difficulties arising out of the negotiation
and renegotiation of Treaties One and Two had cautioned the
government to frame future treaties in quite definite terms
in order to avoid minunderstandings . In most aspects, Treat-
ies Four, Six and Seven were similar to the treaty negotiated
with the Indians of the Lake of the Woods district in 1873 .
1 6
In entering into these treaties 44 with the Canadian
government the Plains Indians accepted two conditions
.
First, they would become 'good and loyal subjects of the
Queen' . They would maintain the peace and observe the laws
of Canada, as well as assisting officers of the law in bring-
ing offending Indians to justice . Second, the Indians ceded
to the Dominion all rights, titles and privileges pertaining
to the various portions of land claimed by the different
bands . With the signing of the treaties, aboriginal land
title in the North-West was extinguished .
In return the Indians were to receive a number of con-
siderations from the government . Reserves of land were to
be set aside for each band at the rate of one square mile
for every family of five . The reserves were to be legally
encumbered so that the Indians could not sell or alienate
this land . The treaties also guaranteed the Indians' right
to continue hunting, trapping and fishing on lands surren-
dered to the Crown, subject to government regulation .
At the signing of the treaties money payments were to be
made to the Indians at the rate of twenty-five dollars to each
band chief, fifteen dollars to each headman (a total of four
headmen being allowed for each band), and twelve dollars to
each of the other members of the bands taking treaty . Chiefs
were to be awarded silver medals, suits of clothing and flags ;
powder, shot, blankets and some provisions were to be distrib-
uted among the bands . The government further agreed to make
annual payments to the Indians, at the same rates as above
1 7
for leaders, while the remaining members of the bands would
receive five dollars .
While the government assumed some responsibility for
helping the Indians to maintain themselves in the coming
years, this responsibility was carefully limited by the
terms of the treaties . Small grants for the purchase of
twine, shot and ammunition were to be made each year .
45
It was intended that these supplies should be used by the
Indians in hunting and fishing, which were expected to
provide a part of their living . Limited amounts of seed,
agricultural implements and stock were to be issued to each
band as they settled on reserves . The treaties also stipu-
lated that liquor would be banned from the reserves and
that the government would undertake the responsibility of
maintaining a school and teacher on each reserve .
While these terms appeared in each of Treaties Four,
Six and Seven there were, however, several unique provisions
included in Treaty Six . One of these provisions was that a
medicine chest would be kept at the house of each Indian
agent for the use and benefit of the Indians . An even more
important stipulation was included near the end of that treaty ;
That in the event hereafter of the Indians
comprised within this treaty being overtaken
by any pestilence, or by a general famine,
the Queen on being satisfied and certified
thereof by her Indian Agent or Agents, will
grant to the Indians assistance of such
character and to such an extent as her Chief
Superintendent of Indian Affairs shall deem
necessary and sufficient to relieve the Indians
from ~Pe calamity that shall have befallen
them .
1 6
This celebrated 'famine clause' was to figure prominently
in the administration of Indian affairs in the coming years
.
Another unique provision of Treaty Six was that the
government agreed that each spring it would expend the gum
of one thousand dollars for the purchase of provisions to
assist the various bands in seeding their crops . The explan-
ation for the inclusion of these special terms in Treaty
Six was that without them the Indians of the Saskatchewan
would not have signed the treaty . Lieutenant-Governor Morris
reported that several Saulteaux Indians from the Qu'Appelle
district had been on hand to stir up opposition to the
government's proposal . 47 The bands that met the government
commissioners at Forts Carlton and Pitt in the autumn of
1876 had apparently been forewarned that the terms offered
by the government were not sufficiently generous to permit
them to settle on reserves . As a result the Cree insisted
upon these special provisions, and received them . There
were, however, a number of bands for whom the treaties, even
with these additional provisions, were not acceptable . Nearly
seven years passed before Big Bear's band agreed to Treaty
Six . By that time the government was prepared to offer Big
Bear more favourable conditions than it had in 1876 .
While the treaties provided a general outline of the
form government policy towards the Indians was to take in
the coming years, the actual administration of Indian affairs
in the North-West was to be greatly affected by a number of
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underlying principles . It was the intention of both Liberal
and Conservative governments to maintain the utmost economy
in the administration of Indian affairs . The terms of the
treaties would be strictly observed . It was clearly the in-
tention of the government to commit itself no further in aid-
ing the Indians than was stipulated in the treaties .
At the same time government policy was directed towards
the overall objective of assisting the Indians to self-
sufficiency so that they would not be dependent on the gov-
ernment for their living . The difficulty of achieving this
goal and at the same time maintaining economy in government
expenditure was to plague Indian administration in the
coming period . Nevertheless, the Canadian government was
determined that its actions towards the Indians would be
very different from those practised by the United States
government under similar circumstances . David Mills, the
Minister of the Interior in the latter years of the Trackenzie
administration, made it an article of faith that the Canadian
government would afford the Indians of the North-West a more
humanitarian treatment than the Americans had provided their
Western Indians . 48 This principle was maintained by the sub-
sequent Conservative administration, and was repeated so often
by government officials that the proud boast of the humanitar-
ianism of Canadian Indian administration came to reek of a
certain smugness .
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE BUFFALO
The immediate problem confronting the Canadian govern-
ment in its administration of Indian affairs in the North-
West concerned the decline of the buffalo herds in that
area . The ramifications of the wanton slaughter of buffalo
by robe hunters in the United States extended across the
border, for the buffalo knew no national boundaries . As
early as 1874 the Canadian government had received warnings
that the numbers of the buffalo were diminishing . 1 The
significance of this development was clearly defined by the
Deputy-T.inister of the Interior, Mr . Meredith :
Heretofore, the Indians of the West have
relied exclusively on the buffalo . Some few
years ago this supply of food seemed practic-
ally inexhaustible . But owing to the increase
of white and half-breed hunters, the buffaloes
have in the last few years been rapidly dimin-
ishing in numbers, and there seems every reason
to expect under the existing state of things
they will within the next decade of years
be entirely exterminated . To the Indians ex-
termination of the buffalo means starvation
and death . . . .
Should the slaughter of buffaloes be contin-
ued at the same rate for only two or three years,
we may expect serious disturbances among the
Indians, and possibly an In ian war or a repeti-
tion of the Sioux massacre .
In subsequent years it became increasingly apparent that
the buffalo were facing an early extinction, leavirg the
Indians to starve or raid Hudson's Bay Company posts and the
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cattle and provisions of incoming settlers .3
By 1876 the situation in the North-West had become
critical . The influx of large numbers of Sioux Indians -
refugees from the Battle of the Little Big Horn - into the
southwestern section of the territories had increased pres-
sures on the buffalo herds . In a meeting between Sub-Inspector
Denny of the North-West Mounted Police and a council of Black-
foot chiefs in July 1876, Crowfoot, the Blackfoot spokesman,
explained the Indians' dilemma :
We all see that the day is coming when the
buffalo will all be killed, and we shall have
nothing more to live on, and then you will
come into our camp and see the poor Blackfeet
starving . . . . Vi'e are getting shut in, the Crees
are coming into our country from the north,
and the White men from the south and east, and 4
they are all destroying our means of living . . . .
The question posed to the Canadian government was
whether any measures could be taken to avert or retard the
extermination of the buffalo . Individual members from both
Liberal and Conservative parties suggested that the preserv-
ation of game in the North-West constituted part of the gov-
ernment's treaty obligations .5 It was hoped that if the ex-
termination of the buffalo could not be entirely prevented,
that it could at least be delayed for several years .6
In October of 1875 the Department of Justice prepared a
report relating to the protection of the buffalo which was
referred to the North-,vest Territorial Council . A Sub-com-
mittee of the Council examined the report, heard suggestions
2 2
from various persons and then submitted its findings to the
federal government . ? In the introduction to the report it was
noted that the "threatened early extinction of the Buffalo is
a question of grave importance to the North-West Territories",
and that the Indians' ignorance of agriculture and dependence
upon the buffalo made it necessary that the buffalo should be
preserved for them until they could gradually provide their
own subsistence .
The Sub-Committee received a variety of recommendations
from several sources . Commissioner French of the North-West
Mounted Police, and Father Andre, an Oblate missionary who
lived among the half-breeds of the South Saskatchewan, both
suggested that an export duty be imposed on buffalo robes and
pemmican . 8 Moreover French advised that severe punishment be
imposed in cases where buffalo had been killed and less than
half the meat removed . Father Andre proposed that a closed
season on buffalo hunting be enforced for the whites and
Metis between the first of June and the first of November, and
that these two groups be forbidden to pass the winter on the
prairie under a heavy penalty and confiscation of thier robes . 9
Suggestions submitted by a Select Committee of the North-
West Territorial Council were based on the premise that the
decline of the buffalo had resulted from certain half-breeds
and whites indulging in a wanton slaughter of whole herds,
"without being able to make use of any but-a small proportion
of the flesh for food" .
10
The Select Committee offered several
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recommendations by which this indiscriminate slaughter might
be ended . It was advised that the buffalo hunting season be
restricted to the period falling between the first of July
and the first of January . Moreover, the use of buffalo pounds
or similar contrivances was to be strictly prohibited for the
hunting of buffalo . The select Committee also urged that it be
made unlawful to kill any buffalo under the age of two years .
11
In order that the Indians might be provided for during the
closed season, the Select Committee put forward the suggestion
that the Dominion government should make some provision for
their maintenance, supplying them with necessary food or
other aid in conformity with treaty regulations . This recom-
mendation was, however, rather awkwardly qualified later in
the report :
It cannot be expected that the Dominion gov-
ernment can undertake to do much more for the
Indians than carry out their treaty engage-
ments unless it can be accomplished in the
direction of protecting their staple article
of food from destruction until they have to
some P tent mastered the arts of civilized
life .
In its summation of the various recommendations re-
ceived, the Sub-Committee took exception to the suggestion
that an export duty on buffalo robes be introduced . Not
only were export duties objectionable in principle to Lib-
eral members of the Council, such as David Laird, but it was
argued that even if these duties could be effectively
carried out, this would do nothing to prevent the wanton
destruction of the buffalo . The export duty was also opposed
2 4
on constitutional grounds . As the protection and care of
game was one of the powers assigned to the Territorial Coun-
cil by the North-West Territories Act of 1875, and as export
duties could only be imposed by the senior government, the
Sub-Committee could not recommend that the Dominion Parlia-
ment legislate upon the subject in this manner
. The constit-
utional argument was spurious as there was nothing prevent-
ing the Territorial Council from requesting that an export
duty on buffalo hides be imposed by the federal government
.
In the end, the Sub-Committee advised that local legislation
and regulation of the hunt would provide the best mode of
protecting the buffalo .
The question of the preservation of the buffalo was once
more raised in i+iarch 1877 in the House of Commons . In reply
to a query from a Conservative member, David Mills informed
the House that
He was of the opinion that it had better be
left to be dealt with by the government of
the North-West rather than by Parliament . . .
The local government . . . could probably de-
vise a cheaper and better plan than this
Parliament, it being on tYS spot and more
familiar with the matter .
For whatever reason, the Dominion government had clearly
abdicated responsibility for preservation of the buffalo
by referring the problem to the North-West Territorial Coun-
cil . 'hile an unsuccessful ordinance based on the recommend-
ations of the Select Committee . was passed by the Territorial
Council, 14 its measures proved both ineffective and too late
to prevent the disappearance of the buffalo .
15
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During the years 1878 and 1879, the buffalo herds which
had previously ranged freely between the North-West and the
bordering American territories of Montana and North Dakota,
were driven from Canadian soil . The disappearance of the
buffalo from the North-attest was complicated, however, by the
fact that large numbers of buffalo remained south of the
border until 1883 . 16 The dictates of nature and the hunger
of Canadian Indians proved more decisive in determining the
ultimate fate of the buffalo than either the white politic-
ians in Ottawa or their counterparts in the North-West Terri-
tories .
In the spring of 1878, unusually mild weather fostered
the spread of prairie fires in the south-western section of
the Territories, and a good deal of the buffalo's usual pas-
turage was destroyed . 17 As a result, the buffalo herds were
forced to winter on the plains between the North and South
Saskatchewan Rivers . Being confined to this small area, the
buffalo came under tremendous pressure from travelling bands
of Blackfoot coming from the west, the Crees from the north
and east, and the Sioux and Assiniboines in the Cypress Hills
district . In the course of that winter, the buffalo headed
south to the western part of the Montana territory to escape
this ever tightening circle .
In the summer of 1879 the buffalo herds once again began
moving towards the North-West . Before they reached the Cypress
Hills they were met by large bands of hunters from the various
tribes in the North-West, and were forced to return south .
18
2 6
On each occasion in the following years when the buffalo
attempted to head north they encountered large forces of
Indians whose spirited hunting in effect created a cordon
between the buffalo and the North-West
. While small herds
of buffalo did occasionally slip into the North-Nest Terri-
tories following 1879, they were quickly exterminated by the
hungry native population . 19
In spite of previous warnings regarding the gradual de-
cline in the buffalo herds the final disappearance of the
buffalo in the North-West struck observers with its sudden-
ness and finality . In December of 1878, Commissioner PM'ac-
Leod of the North-West Mounted Police had predicted that the
buffalo would not last as a supply of food for the Indians
more than three or four years . 20
In his annual report for
1879 MacLeod expressed his surprise that the buffalo had been
so quickly and completely driven out of the Territories
.
21
At the same time, occasional incursions of small herds of
buffalo into the North-vilest encouraged some government offic-
ials to express the hope that the buffalo might yet return
some day . 22
This type of wishful thinking contributed largely
to the inconsistency of subsequent government action .
With the disappearance of the buffalo from the North-
','lest there were numerous accounts of widespread starvation
among the Plains Indians . Both the Cree and the Blackfoot
were reported to be in a starving condition during the spring
and summer of 1878 .
L3
By the next summer the state of the
Plains Indians, and particularly the Blackfoot had become
27
desperate . One government official reported that the Black-
foot Indians were
selling their Horses for a mere song, eating
gophers, mice, and for the first time have
hunted the Antelope and nearly killed them
all off . . .
Strong young men were now so weak
that some of them could hardly walk . Others
who last winte54 were fat and hearty are mere
skin and bone .
One Blackfoot woman told the local trader that "if I can't
get any food for my two children I must kill myself, I live
only for them and I can't bear to see them starve"
. 25
In response to the buffalo's disappearance from the
North-West, there resulted a general southward movement
among the Plains Indians in pursuit of the herds . A number
of Cree bands which normally resided in the valley of the
North Saskatchewan River moved to the Cypress Hills . From
this location they were able to mount hunting expeditions
south of the border . A great many of the Blackfoot Indians
also pursued the buffalo into Triontana Territory .
The critical situation of the Plains Indians during this
period greatly increased the anxiety felt about Indian matters
in the North-West . Though various government officials re-
marked on the Indians' generally submissive behaviour, never-
theless, several incidents underlined growing unrest among
the native people . In Liarch 1878, some four hundred Indians
in the Qu'Appelle district, having requested provisions from
the officer in charge of government stores at that point and
having been refused, took forcible possession of the provis-
ions . 26 Owing to the miserable condition of these Indians,
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no action was taken by the government in response to the
seizure . There were also numerous reports that the Indians
were killing large numbers of cattle in the Bow River dist-
rict and. some in the neighbourhood of Fort Walsh
. Commis-
sioner YacLeod was inclined to dismiss these charges
:
It is undoubtedly the case that they killed
some, but nothing like the numbers claimed
.
It is the opinion of many respectable stock-
men that whites had more to do with it than
the Indians . A great many cattle must have
strayed back to T, ,lontana and a great many
more must have perished in the storms which
have a~jed over the country in March last
L1878
Despite the restraint exercised by the Indians,it was
clear that with the disappearance of the buffalo the rela-
tionship of the Indians with the government had changed . In
a meeting in November 1878, between the Lieutenant-Governor
Laird and some twelve hundred Cree Indians at Sounding Lake,
the Cree spokesman, Big Bear, pointed out that as the Great
Spirit had supplied the Indians with plenty of buffalo for
food until the whiteman came, and as that means of support
was about to fail them, the government ought to take the
place of the Great Spirit and provide the Indians with the
means of living in some other way . 28 This view was further
conveyed to the government in a letter from James MacKay, a
prominent Scotch half-breed, to the Deputy-Minister of Public
Works, Colonel Dennis, in February 1879 :
Formerly we were mere visitors to their
country ; recently we have incurred obliga-
tions towards them of an extensive and
binding nature . They had no claim on us
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before ; now they look to us
in everything
. . . Our arrival in the country leading to
the disappearance of the buffalo is regard-
ed by them as the f2~ndation of any want
they may suffer . . . .
Clearly, the time for government action had arrived .
The responsibility for meeting the famine crisis of
1879-1880 fell to the newly elected Conservative government
of Sir John A . Macdonald . The significance of the develop-
ment and settlement of the North-West in the program of the
new administration was emphasized by the Prime Minister
as-
suming the office of the Minister of the Interior himself
. 30
Yet, while the importance of Indian affairs in the settle-
ment of the North West was recognized, the new government
was quite unprepared for the crisis of 1879 . For the most
part the government's administration of Indian affairs dur-
ing that year was characterized by a lack of direction and
by desperate efforts to avoid Indian depredations .
The speech given in the House of Commons on May 1, 1879
by Macdonald demonstrated the government's bewilderment with
the events then unfolding in the North-West . 31 He noted
that as long as the pressure for food existed it was entirely
possible that unfortunate consequences might ensue
. While
the government was aware of the scope of the problem, the
solution proposed by the Prime Minister -
that of inducing the
Indians to undertake agricultural pursuits -
was merely a
repetition of the vague program written into the treaties
.
But, in spite of the lack of inspiration in Macdonald's state-
ment there were included two significant departures from
30
previous government thinking about Indian administration
.
First, he predicted that a good deal of money would have
to be expended on Indian affairs in the North-West
. The
government would have to develop patience and forbearance
in dealing with the Indians
. Equally important was his
announcement that it was impossible to govern Indian
affairs satisfactorily from Ottawa
. Great care, vigour and
prudence would have to be exercised in the management of
Indian affairs in the region east of the hocky Mountains
to Lake Superior
. The best method of achieving these aims,
Macdonald stated, lay in greater local supervision of Indian
administration . The burden of carrying out these responsib-
ilities fell to Edgar Dewdney, who was appointed Indian Com-
missioner for the North-West Territories in May of 1879 .
The events of 1879 demonstrated the need for more effect-
ive local control of Indian administration
. Arriving in the
North-'Jest in July, Dewdney discovered that the Indians'
.cQn-
dition was much more serious than had been imagined in Ottawa .
Fortunately, the instructions issued to the new Indian Com-
misioner by the government were quite flexible, allowing him
a fair degree of latitude in dealing with these difficulties .
The immediate problem in the North-West was that of mas-
sive Indian starvation . 32 The necessity of supplying the
Plains Indians with at least limited provisions had been
recognized earlier that spring . Lieutenant-Governor Laird in
March of 1879 had applied for and received a credit of ten
thousand dollars which enabled him to extend temporary relief
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to the Indians at
Battleford, Duck Lake and Qu'Appelle
. As
well, he gave the following instructions to Dewdney
:
You will find, on arriving at Forts Walsh and
IdacLeod, that steps have already been taken to
provide a supply of food for pressing emergen-
cies . These supplies you will cause to be dis-
tributed in such a manner as may be most expe-
dient a~~ so as to afford the maximum amount of
relief .
One hundred bags of flour and fifty cattle were to be pro-
vided the Indians at each point .
The decision to provide the starving Indians of the
North-Nest with relief had been prompted by a joint sense
of obligation and fear . The inclusion of the famine clause
in Treaty Six had morally, if not legally committed the gov-
ernment to this course . It was, however, difficult to separ-
ate the motives of responsibility and fear in justifying the
feeding of the Indians . As James MacKay stated
We should not be much in excess of our duty
were we to provide in some measure for those
destitute Indians who at the present moment
are driven to choose between Starvation and
killing the settlers' cattle .
By the end of June, it was apparent that the provisions
issued to the Indians at various points were wholly inade-
quate to satisfy their needs . In a letter to the I1inister
of the Interior, David Laird reported that there had been
virtually no game in the Battleford district during the last
two months . 35 While the Indians had been fortunate in acquir-
ing fair quantities of fish and berries, supplemented by lim-
ited government provisions, their situation was nonetheless
wretched . Laird also stated that the local Indian agent had
32
nearly exhausted his relief supplies ; at the same time he
noted that greater economy could not have been safely exer-
cised . Although the Indians' conduct had been remarkable,
considering their desperate condition, Laird felt it necess-
ary to request an increase in the Mounted Police force and
to ask that some steps be taken to fortify the Police post
at Battleford .
36
In response to this critical state of affairs the fed-
eral government in August 1879 called for a council to meet
in Battleford later that month, "to consider the whole sit-
uation and concert measures to avert the apparently impend-
ing calamity of famine among the Indians" . 37 The council
was to include the Lieutenant-Governor, the Indian Commis-
sioner, the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police,
and several other local officials . 38 Laird and Dewdney
were authorized by the government to give full effect to
the meeting of the Council in case telegraphic communica-
tion with Ottawa was not possible .
The Battleford Council met for the first time on
August 26 and 27 1879 . After a day and a half of discussion,
the Council passed the following resolution
Resolved - That the Conference having mat-
urely considered the state of the Indians
in the North -Vv'est Territories, and the sour-
ces from which they can supply themselves
with food, is of opinion that the fears en-
tertained of an approaching famine are only
too well grounded, and that unless a very
large supply of provisions is furnished by
Government, for issue during the coming
'Punter, a great number of Indians will be
without the amount of food absolutely neces-
sary to sustain life . Should this state of
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affairs arise, and it appears to the Confer-
ence to be inevitable, it will be fraught
with such dire consequences not only to the
Indians themselves, but to the many settlers
scattered throughout the Territories, that
immediate steps should be taken
3 o avert,
if possible, so great a calamity .
The Council gave effect to this resolution by ordering that
large quantities of beef, bacon, flour, fish and pemmican
were to be distributed at various points in the North-West
. 40
At a subsequent meeting of the Council on the 15th and
16th of September it was decided that further quantities of
bacon and flour should be stored at Qu'Appelle before winter
set in. It was further resolved that recommendations con-
cerning the establishment of new Mounted Police posts and
the change of existing ones should be left to the Police
Commissioner
. Nevertheless, the Council suggested that the
number of Police at Qu'Appelle and Battleford should be in-
creased before winter . 41
There remained the necessity of adopting some system
for the . administration of regular rations to the Indians .
Prior to the meetings of the Battleford Council, Dewdney had
taken great care to avoid leaving the Indians with the im-
pression that they would be fed whether they worked or not . 42
Yet, as the summer progressed, the impracticality of con-
sistently applying this rule became obvious to him . Until
the Indians were settled on reserves, there was, in effect,
no work that they could do
. in the meantime, the starving
condition of the Indians rendered the operation of such a
proviso impossible
. In talks with a Cree band, including
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non-Treaty Indians, that Dewdney met with near Battleford
on August 20, he promised that the government would not let
them starve . 43 The following year, when the threat of an
Indian uprising had subsided, the government re-imposed the
dictum that rations were to be issued to able-bodied Indians
only in return for labour .
44
Although the government had been forced to ration the
Indians of the North-VfZest in 1879, this large expenditure
had not been undertaken without considerable soul searching .
Liaintenance of the strictest economy was a prime considera-
tion of Indian administration during this period . Even
though the government realized the absolute necessity of
feeding the Indians during the famine crisis,4 5 the dedica-
tion to economy in Indian affairs was so deeply engrained in
federal politicians that the Conservatives were making ser-
ious efforts to justify their actions . In a letter to the
Prime Minister in September 1879, Dewdney advised that while
he anticipated no serious trouble with the Indians during
the coming winter, he did not propose to make light of exag-
gerated reports appearing in the newspapers . 46 "I think it
better that the people should have the 'brazen side of the
shield' at present exhibited to them and then they won't
grumble at the large expenditure the new system involves ." 47
The difficulty of defending the increased appropriation
for Indian administration in the North-West, put together
with the questionable value of the buffalo as a future source
of subsistence, made it imperative that the government
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proceed with its program to convert the Indians to agricult-
ural pursuits . 48 Some efforts had already been made in this
direction under the Mackenzie Administration . Limited farm-
ing operations had been initiated on Indian reserves in the
Qu'Appelle district in 1877, and in the Battleford district
in 1878 . Early returns, however, had not been promising .
The extension of the farming program constituted a major
part of the Conservative reorganization of Treaties Four, Six
and Seven in 1879 . An outline of this program was contained
in the instructions issued to Indian Commissioner Dewdney .
It was proposed that fifteen farming agencies be established
throughout the North-West Territories . At these agencies the
Indians would be instructed in agricultural operations by
farming instructors . On the two agencies which were to be
located. within Treaty Seven, farming would be carried on on
a larger scale, in an effort to produce cheaply a large quant-
ity of the rations being issued . The implementation of the
program was unfortunately delayed for a year, as the farming
instructors and farmers did not arrive in the North-West
until July 1879, too late to do much more than prepare land
for seeding the following year .
The government had nonetheless committed itself to a
policy of agricultural development for the Indians of the
North West Territories . Alarmed by the prospect of footing
a massive appropriation for feeding the Indians of the North-
West, the Conservatives had eagerly seized upon the agricult-
ural development program, which promised to make the Indians
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more or less self-sufficient in a few years . Though grave
doubts were expressed by some politicians whether the Indians
could be suddenly converted from a nomadic, hunting way of
life to a sedentary, agrarian existence, 49 the government
seemed unable to formulate an alternative prograrn . 50 Thus,
the Prime Minister, who himself harboured misgivings about
the feasibility of the reserve agricultural policy, found it
expedient to promote the program in Parliament . 51 Inevit-
ably, it was the Indians and not the politicians who suffered
the consequences of the farming program during the next five
years .
37
CHAPTER THREE
THE RESERVE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM
Fresh initiative and great optimism became evident
in Canadian Indian administration in 1880 . In May of that
year, the importance of Indian affairs in the plans of the
government was formally recognized with the creation of the
Department of Indian Affairs . Previously Indian affairs in
Canada had been administered by the Secretary of State and
by the Department of the Interior . 1 1880 was also marked
by the initiation of the government's reserve agricultural
program in the North-West Territories .
During that summer, over eleven thousand Indians settled
upon reserves, built houses and fenced and broke land for
cultivation . 2 Over four and a half thousand acres of land
were added to the thirty-five hundred acres then under cult-
ivation . The harvest yielded moderate though promising
quantities of wheat, oats, barley and potatoes . Included in
Indian Commissioner Dewdney's report for 1880 was an extract
describing the agricultural progress achieved that summer
on Red Pheasant's reserve near Eattleford in Treaty Six :
The crop on this reserve was magnificent .
The potato yield was very heavy, Early
Rose and Early Round the only two kinds
grown . The barley and wheat I am happy
to say came to maturity . The turnips and
beets cannot be surpassed,but the carrots,
38
owing to not being thinned in time are in
some cases small
. These Indians are intel-
ligent, peacefully inclined and good work-
ers . I took pride in helping them and with
the assistance of ex-Indian Instructor, Mc-
cord they have advanced materially in farm-
ing . . . . When you come to consider sir, that
this band had but some ten acres of land
under crop and four houses built in 1879, I
think it will aypear to you that they have
not done badly .
In spite of the optimism generated by initial farming
operations in tide North-West there was no question of dis-
continuing the rationing of bands settled on reserves
.
Though a few of the bands were in a position to eke out an
existence, Commissioner Dewdney reported that eight-tenths
of the Indians of the North-West were helpless . 4 In the
Speech from the Throne opening the 1880-1881 Session of
Parliament the Governor-General reported that he greatly
regretted "being obliged to state that the entire failure
of the usual food supply of the Indians in the North-West,
to which I called your attention last session, has contin-
ued during the present session and has involved the neces-
sity of a large expenditure in order to save them from ab-
solute starvation ." 5 If the Indians were to be encouraged
to settle on the reserves and take up agriculture it was
essential that they be issued rations by the government .
For the first few years at least the Indians would not only
have to be clothed to a certain extent but they would have
to be fed . 6
If the government was to expect a fair day's
work from the Indians it was necessary that they be provided
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a fair day's rations
. Though the expense of these provisions
would at first be great, it was pointed out by the Commiss-
ioner that the government would at least have the satisfac-
tion of knowing that it was obtaining value for its money . 7
There remained the task of justifying ration expendi-
tures in Parliament . The Liberal opposition, headed by
Indian Affairs critic, David Mills, had. made a ritual of ex-
amining the very considerable expenditures for the Indians
of the North-West with the utmost scrutiny . 8 Inquiries as
to how long the government proposed to supply the Indians of
the North-West with rations emerged repeatedly in d .ebates . 9
On the Government's side Sir John A . Macdonald countered
that it was no fault of either the Government or the Oppos-
ition that the buffalo had disappeared .
10
Given this situ-
ation the government had the alternative of either feeding
the Indians or letting them starve . Though Macdonald denied
that the government was feeding the Indians in order to keep
them quiet, he did suggest that, "If an Indian is starving
and sees a white man's cattle grazing he will not starve ; he
will shoot the white man's ox for food, and it is not unlike-
ly that the white man's ox will shoot down the Indian"[sic] .
11
Llacdonald also noted that Parliament, as one man and with-
out objection, had voted the supplies necessary to enable
the government to assist the Indians to settle on the lands
and to undertake the raising of cattle and the cultivation of
the soil .
12
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Opposition criticism of expenditures in the North-Nest
had the effect of making both the government and the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs acutely conscious of the political
necessity of maintaining economy wherever possible . In let-
ters to the Prime Minister, Sir Leonard Tilley, the Minister
of Finance, frequently expressed grave concern with -the ser-
iousness and expense of Indian administration in the North-
West . 13 As early as 1881, he proposed that the Indians be
employed in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway
in order to offset ration expenditures . Tilley suggested
candidly that the Indians be informed that "they must work
or starve" . 14 The drive for economy was also reflected in
the correspondence of Department officials both in Ottawa
and in the North-West . The assurance that 'everything will
be done to keep expenditures down as much as possible' ap-
peared constantly in Departmental reports and memoranda .
At the same time various officers in the North-Nest,
including the Commissioner, warned of the danger of pressing
considerations of economy to the detriment of the farming
program . While Dewdney confessed to the Prime Minister that
the massive ration expenditure had given him many a sleepless
night he firmly believed that the only solution was to have
plenty of food on hand in the North-West for the next few
years . 15 Though Dewdney promised to take every opportunity to
keep expenses low, he could see no better course than to pur-
chase adequate supplies ahead of time by contract and thus be
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prevented from buying at high local rates when requests were
made
. 16
This view was also shared by T .P . Wadsworth, the Inspect-
or of Farming Agencies in the north-!Nest :
I think it will be better for the Department,
the Government and the country to bravely
"face the music" - to make their minds to the
expenditure [sic] and prepare for it . . . for
as the Globe said the other day in its
editorial upon the report of our Department
"It is better to feed than to fight them" -
and the difference between what they are now
receiving and what they could probably be
brought down to would be so very trifling it
will at this time be hardly worth the risk .
If we put the newcomers upon half-rations
they will never settle to work . There is
absolutely no game or other resource for an
Indian here in the south to honestly get17
food except what the Government gives him .
It was difficult to object to Wadsworth's reasoning in prac-
tical terms . Even though the government was rationing nearly
18,000 Indians in Treaties Four, Six and Seven, the average
daily ration per person was a mere three quarters of a pound
of flour and three quarters of a pound of beef, and did not
cost the government more than eight cents per head per day . 18
This was in marked contrast to the fifty cents per day spent
by the Department to feed white farm labourers . 19
Another important feature of government ration policy
in the North West was the stipulation that the Indians not
be given something for nothing . As was explained in the
Department of Indians Affairs' Report for 1880, "The system
pursued in affording relief to the Indians is calculated to
42
accustom them to habits of industry ; and at the same time to
teach them to depend or. their own efforts for subsistence .
Under that system all able-bodied Indians are required to
work for the food given themselves and families .",
2C
In re-
turn for the relief afforded them the Indians built houses,
fenced fields and cultivated crops under the supervision and
direction of the farming instructors . 21 The Deputy Super-
intendent General of Indian Affairs, Lawrence Vankoughnet,
was particularly zealous in insisting that this rule be
strictly adhered to . There was, however, some difficulty in
rigidly maintaining the "no work no food" policy in the field .
As . Commissioner Dewdney was well aware, it was not always
possible to find work for all of the Indians, nor were they
adequately clad for working during the winter months . 22 Still,
they could not be and were not denied rations in such circum-
stances .
The position adopted by the government was that while
the rationing of the Indians in the North-West would init-
ially incur great expenditure, the Indians would within two
or three years achieve some degree of self-sufficiency .
23
In
an annlication to the Privy Council, in June of 1881, for a
supplementary grant to meet departmental over-expenditures
in the North-'"pest, the Prime Minister predicted that that
year's harvest in Treaties Four and Six would be sufficient
to feed Indians settled on reserves for three, if not four
months of the coming year . 24 Although certain officials
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expressed the opinion that ration expenses and overall costs
would not soon decrease, and that they would in all probab-
ility sharply increase during the next few years, 25 an
attitude of optimism prevailed in government circles . Any
doubts that may have beer. harboured by 1 ,Zacdonald and his
subordinates were glossed over by official pronouncements
that everything was proceeding satisfactorily in the North-
West
.
26
Frior to 1883, participation in the reserve farming
program was generally restricted to bands residing within
the boundaries of Treaty Six and in the eastern section of
Treaty Four . There remained in the southern section of the
North-West a large portion of the native population, whose
involvement in agricultural pursuits was either extremely
limited or non-existent .
27
Centered around Fort HacLeod and
Cypress Hills, these Indians had in 1879 chosen to follow the
buffalo, even though this necessitated travelling south of
the border .
Many of the southern Indians, and especially those in
Treaty Seven, did not wish to settle on reserves until they
were assured that they would receive adequate assistance
from the government in undertaking farming operations . 28 The
Indians in the Cypress Hills district, on the other hand,
were as Dewdney noted, "very independent and won't think of
settling until the buffalo are gone and they are convinced
they won't come back" .
29
The determination of the southern
44
Indians to continue hunting the buffalo proved quite advant-
ageous to the federal government . As long as the buffalo
remained the government would be relieved of the expense of
feeding these Indians and assisting them in farming. In the
meantime, government efforts and resources could be concen-
trated on developing existing reserves . 30
Dewdney had very early recognized the expediency of
encouraging the southern Indians to remain with the buffalo .
In the fall of 1879, he had strongly advised the Blackfoot
to follow the buffalo and had even given them some provis-
ions for the southward journey . 31 The next year the Black-
foot sent messengers from their camp in Montana to ask
Dewdney whether or not they should return to receive their
annuity payments . Once again the Indian Commissioner advised
them to remain with the buffalo . 32 Dewdney wrote to the Prime
T,irister that according to his calculations the absence of
the southern Indians during this period had saved the govern-
ment at least $10C,000 .
33
While Dewdney obviously appreciated the manner in which
the southern Indians had helped themselves during this period,
other officials were not of the same mind . As the herds
steadily decreased in the United States, Lawrence Vankoughnet
suggested that the buffalo were in fact acting as a hindrance
to government objectives as they served only "to unsettle the
Indians and prevent them from cultivating the soil" . 34 Al-
though Commissioner Irvine of the North-West Mounted Police
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and a number of cabinet ministers tended to agree with Dewdney
that "the buffalo are our best allies", 35 the government was
unable to decide between these two opposing views . Thus, an
ineffectual and uneasy compromise existed between these two
essentially irreconcilable viewpoints .
The ambivalence of government thinking resulted in an
attempt at farming in the Cypress Hills district which was
ultimately given up due to the unsuitability of the area
for agriculture
.36 The supply farju established in 1880 near
Fort MacLeod also encountered difficulties . Promising crops
were destroyed by frost in both 1880 and 1881, 37
and a cattle
raising venture on the Blackfoot reserve was discontinued in
1883 for lack of success . 38
Presented with the extreme dif-
ficulty of introducing agriculture in the south, the govern-
ment continued encouraging the Indians to follow the buffalo .
This course had the advantage of at least providing them
with fresh meat at a cheap rate . 39 Accordingly Dewdney in-
structed C .E . Denny, who assumed duties as Indian Agent at
Fort Walsh in October of 1881, that "as long as the Indians
are with the buffalo there will be no occasion to interfere
with them except so far as keeping yourself posted as to
their movements"
. 40
The amount of "fresh meat" available in the United
States unfortunately declined rapidly during these years .
The pressure exerted upon the remaining buffalo herds in
Mont Lea by bands of both American and Canadian Indians was
steadily increased as the herds decreased in size . In the
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summer of 1880, Canadian Blackfoot south of the border were
unable to kill a sufficient number of buffalo for the making
of their new lodges . 41 Bands of Canadian Indians reappeared
North of the Line from time to time in a terribly weakened
and starving condition . The desperate condition of the
returning hunters created a potentially explosive situation
in the south ; as Commissioner Dewdney succinctly stated "As
long as there is food in the country and they are starving
they will have it" 42
Bowing to the dictates of necessity, the government in
1881 initiated a system of providing rations to supplement
hunting returns in the south . -Interestingly enough, the as-
sistance extended to the Blackfoot Indians was considerably
more generous than that granted Indians in the Cypress Hills
district . 43 It would seem likely that the Blackfoot's reput-
ation for "ferocity and lawlessness" 44 was partially res-
ponsible for more liberal provisions . Another reason for
the lower rate of rations issued in the Cypress Hills lay in
the government's awareness that at some point in the not too
distant future, it would become necessary to move Indians
from that district to reserves along the North Saskatchewan
and Qu'Appelle Rivers .
Relations between the Canadian and American governments
had been sorely tried during the late 1870's and early 1880's
by Indian matters in the North-West . While the American gov-
ernment had been annoyed by the Canadian decision to grant
47
American Sioux, under the leadership of Sitting Bull, asylum
following 1876, it was greatly upset by the well founded sus-
picion that the Canadian government had deliberately encour-
aged some of its Indians to hunt buffalo south of the border .
45
Assistant Commissioner Galt was informed by American army
authorities in March of 1880 that it was "absolutely neces-
sary that we should make our Indians go home as soon as poss-
ible" . 46 3hile it was admitted that up to the present they
had behaved themselves very well, the Americans feared that
some indiscretion might be committed in which case they would
have to forcibly remove the Canadian Indians from American
soil . 47
While the Canadian Government reasoned that Indians of
either country had since the time of the Boundary Commiss-
ion been allowed to roam at will in pursuit of the buffalo, 48
it soon became apparent that, if the Canadian Government would
take no action with regard to this matter, the Americans were
fully prepared to send out troops and drive the Canadian
Indians across the border . Finally, in the summer of 1882,
the American Government acted unilaterally to end the movementt
of Canadian Indians in American territory by forcing them to
return to their own hunting grounds, destroying their lodges
and confiscating their goods . 4p Still as long as a sizable
population of unsettled Indians remained in the Cypress Hills
it was certain that there would be occasional forays by these
Indians into the United States to hunt buffalo and to steal
48
horses. . Canadian fears of further altercations with the
American Government made it imperative that the Cypress Hills
Indians be moved to the north and to the northeast .
Unfortunately for the Indians, the Canadian Government
was prepared to delay this move as long as possible, and thus
made no consistent effort to have them settle on reserves in
the north until 1882 . 50 Although both the Commissioners of
the North-West Mounted Police and the acting Indian Agent
at Fort Walsh had in 1881 strongly urged the abandonment
of that post and the termination of rationing there 51 _ an
action which would have forced the Indians to settle in the
north - the government refused to act with such finality .
in fact the Department adopted a policy of issuing the Indis
ans rations just sufficient to prevent starvation and to
avoid an outbreak / The result of this decision was that
the Indians remained in the Cypress Hills and continued to
enter the United States in search of the rapidly vanishing
buffalo, an occurrence which inevitably produced friction
with the American military . 53 Although there is some indic-
ation that the Canadian government was under pressure from
the C .P .R . not to abandon Fort Walsh, 54 it would appear
that the major reason for the uncomfortable delay was the
government's willingness to put off the date at which it
would have to assume the heavy financial responsibility of
G
settling and feeding these Indians . ' Perhaps the consid-
erable difficulties encountered in moving the Cypress Hills
49
Indians in 1882 and 1883 might have been alleviated had the
government been more concerned with the Indians' welfare
than with maintaining economy . 56
Even as the Cypress Hills Indians were being moved to
reserves in the northern and eastern sections of the Terri-
tories, the government was aware that the farming program
was not proceeding according to plan . In spite of impress-
ive early efforts in Treaties Four and Six, the Indians by
1883 were far from being self-sufficient . In Treaty Seven,
agricultural development had only been half-heartedly
attempted by the Department with the result that the ration
expenditures there were more than twice as large as in the
other two Treaties combined . 57 Although agricultural reports
for the North-West superintendency indicated steady progress
both in terms of the amount of new land being cultivated
and in crop returns, the necessity of providing rations to
the reserve Indians remained . 58
The failure of the reserve farming program - for it did
fail to meet the goals set for it - was not due to a lack
of effort on the part of the Indians . Agents and instruct-
ors from all sections of the Territories praised the Indians'
attempts to make a success of farming . While the degree of
enthusiasm necessarily variedd from band to band, the follow-
ing statement included in the report from the farming instruc-
tor in the File Hills Agency (Treaty Four) was not untypical :
Little Black Bear and his men kept the oxen
steadily at work and three families who came
last fall have broken up enough land with
50
their hoes for gardens and potatoes . The Chief
set his men a good example by staying close to
his reserve though not able to work himself .
It is elapouragement to the men to see the Chief
around .
Considering that prairie agriculture was then in its infancy
and that the development of suitable crops, farming techniques
and agricultural equipment for the northern climate still lay
ahead, the progress made was not inconsiderable .
60
It has been suggested that the "failure" of the Conserv-
atives' agricultural policy was due to the "restlessness . . .
inherent in the Indian disposition" 61 and to the Indians'
"dislike of uncongenial work" 62 ; this interpretation is woe-
fully superficial . The reserve farming program "failed" in
the North-West not only because it was unrealistic in what
it expected to achieve within two or three years, but for
lack of real committment to its objectives within govern-
ment administration itself .
The reserve farming program was undermined by the gov-
ernment's determination to place economy above all other
considerations . As a result the administration of the pro-
gram was from the beginning plagued by inconsistency . The
government was unable to resist encouraging reserve Indians
to hunt and fish whenever this reduced ration expenditures .
Though Deputy-Superintendent-General Vankoughnet in the
spring of 1881 recommended that Indians in the Battleford
district trap muskrats in the spring and fall, and thus save
the Department the expense of provisioning them 63 he was
51
most upset when in the summer of that year Indians under the
leadership of Poundmaker neglected to seed crops and headed
south to hunt buffalo . 64 While it was perfectly clear to
Vankoughnet that farming activities should always take prec-
edence over hunting„ he failed to realize that the Indians'
experience as hunters did not lead them to the same conclus-
ion . P':oreover, as early as 1881 .r:acdonald enquired of Indian
Commissioner Dewdney whether it was not possible that the
Indians might be employed in cutting railroad ties or even
G
labouring on C .P .h : construction gangs .' The Superintend-
ent-General's readiness to employ Indians as wage labourers
did not bode well for the ultimate success of the farming
program .
The drive for economy in Indian administration retarded
agricultural development in other ways as well . In inter-
views with the Governor-General during his tour of the North-
West Territories in the summer of 1881, Indians in the Battle-
ford, Fort' Pitt and Peace Hills districts requested that the
Department ; construct a grist mill in that region so that they
might turn' their grain into flour . 66 The Department, however,
spent three years considering the cheapest method of con-
structing such a grist mill, which would in any case cost
only a few' thousand dollars to construct . In the meantime,
the Indians in the western portion of Treaty Six were left
over a hundred miles away from the nearest grist mill .
A further illustration of the government's engagement in
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false economies appeared in a memorandum from Commissioner
Dewdney to Indian agents in the North-West Territiries con-
cerning the reduction of agent's travelling expenses .
67 The
memorandum dated 13 November 1883 read as follows :
Sir,
!The expenditure incurred every month for
travelling; allowances by the agents has late-
ly'-;rown to such large proportions that it is
found necessary to notify each agent that
their visits to the reserves must be less
frequent than heretofore .
Numbers of the reserves throughout the Ter-
ritories are now in such a shape that they do
not require as heretofore the constant super-
vision of the agent ; and in the future no
allowance will be paid for travelling when the
time exceeds two weeks in the month unless
under exceptional circumstances . This cir9gl-
ar'is to take effect after December, next .
There was sharp reaction to this regulation, for as one
agent noted "If' I see them so seldom they will become dis-
heartened and neglect their work at the proper seasons
. ,69
The regulation, nevertheless, was implemented and a saving
of six dollars and twenty-five cents per day for each agent
was realized by the Department . 7c
The desire to maintain economy, which became almost
compulsive' within the Department, offered considerable
opportunity for less scrupulous agents to engage in corrupt
practices .' While great attention was paid to lowering over-
all expenses, the manner in which this money was spent on
the reserves was not always closely supervised . As was
demonstrated in the case of C .E . Denny, Indian Agent for
Treaty Seven, rigid adherence to the policy of economy, at
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least in one's reports, paid off handsomely . It was discov-
ered by Inspector Wadsworth in August 1882 that not only were
farm labourers, hired by the Department, working on Denny's
own ranch but that Denny had also advised the Department to
purchase a team harness and wagon for the sum of two hun-
dred and fifty dollars, which Wadsworth noted was worth at
the very most eighty dollars 71 Wadsworth also reported
that Denny had had a half interest in one of the horses pur-
chased . Though Denny was retained in the Department's employ
for undisclosed reasons his early actions constituted mere
petty fraud compared to disclosures made of his administra-
tion of Treaty Seven, the following year . A doctor hired by
the Department to attend to Indians in Treaty Seven reported
to Vankoughnet in the fall of 1883 his suspicions that the
fatal sickness that prevailed among those Indians during the
past year had resulted froze the quality of flour supplied
by contractors . 72 An examination of the flour delivered by
I .G . Baker and Company at the Blackfoot Crossing and at
the Sarcee reserve revealed the following results :
1 .' Sample of Flour from the Blackfoot Crossing :
This sample marked Number One is not sound
and should not pass inspection for grading .
Either the wheat has been full of weeds or the
cleanings of the wheat have been ground into
the flour as there is a strong smell and taste
of tares e tc . i n it . We think there is frozen
wheat in it also but would not say so positive-
ly . We do not consider this flour wholesome
and cannot put a price on it .
2 .' Sample of Indian flour from the Sarcee reserve
branded "Ogilvy's Superfine" :
This sample marked' Number Two is the lowest
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grade
of flour and is known by the trade name
as "Red Daub"
. Its value (in Ottawa) is about
one dollar and twenty-five per hundred pounds
compared with Superfine at two dollars and
twenty-five or Strong Bakers at two seventy-
five to three dollars per hundred ~qunds . It
is just one grade above mill feed .
The flour which had been contracted by the Department was
to be equal in quality to Number One Superfine, and cost
the government over forty-one thousand dollars . 74 The
flour delivered was worth a fraction of this sum and res-
ulted in the death of thirty-five to forty persons on dif-
ferent reserves in Treaty Seven . 75 Denny's connivance with
contractors in receiving this flour forced his resignation
from the service . Ironically he had been considered one of
the best agents in the North-West because he kept total ex-
penditures'in the area of his jurisdiction low
. He had
greatly impressed both Dewdney,and Vankoughnet by suggesting
that it was not so much provisions and annuities that would
help the Indians to adapt to civilization but rather kindness
from their agents and instructors . 76
The Conservative government's fixation with economy in
Indian administration was not,
; however, unrepresentative of
contemporary Canadian political thinking on that subject
.
Indeed, compared to the Liberal Opposition which maintained
that the government was responsible only to the extent of
meeting the narrow terms of the treaties, the Conservative
program seemed exceedingly generous and perhaps a little
extravagant . Though Macdonald had accepted the necessity
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of assisting the Indians of the North-West Territories in
1879 and the following years, and had seen this as an essen-
tial aspect of the overall settlement of the region, he was
too perceptive a politician to ignore criticism of the
great expense involved in Indian administration .
During the first few years Macdonald was able to counter
Liberal attacks on the large appropriation for the Indians of
Treaties Four, Six and Seven by appealing to a sense of human-
itarianism among Members of Parliament . 77 Moreover, the Prime
Minister regularly assured the,:House that the government was
doing its best to keep expenditures low :
When the Indians are starving they have been .
helped, but they have been reduced to one half
and one quarter rations . But when they fall
into a state of destitution we cannot allow
them to die for want of food . . . I have reason
to believe that the Agents as a whole, and I
am sure it is the case of the Commissioner,
are doing all they can by refusing food until.
the Indians are on the 7 ~aerge of starvation
to reduce the expenses .
As the years passed and the
self-sufficiency, PMMacdonald
Liberal criticisms .
One of the Liberal's major
the supply ; farms established in
which were, worked by white farm
Indians still remained far
grew increasingly
F
from
sensitive to
targets since 1879 had been
Treaty Seven . These farms,
labourers, had been expected
to produce, a large part of the food necessary for rationing
the Indians in that Treaty . The supply farms were not, how-
ever, a success as they failed to even pay for themselves
let alone', produce a surplus
. With grim regularity the
Liberals brought this fact to the attention of the House dur-
ing supply debates .
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By 1883 the government decided that
the supply farms were too great a political liability and
discontinued them . 80 Oddly enough the conclusion that if
white farmers could not succeed then Indian farmers could
hardly be expected to do more did not occur to either the
Government, or the Opposition . The announcements of the clos-
ures was justified by a statement that the Indians there had
had sufficient opportunity to see how a farm should be
conducted .8 1
In 1882 and 1883 Liberal criticism of Indian expendi-
tures increased, 82 as the country slid into a sudden and
drastic recession . 83 From the time that government revenues
began to dip in the last quarter of 1882 the reserve agri-
cultural program was doomed . The expenditure for Indian
affairs in the North-West, which in 1882 had reached a peak
f $1 106,961 was in 1883 reduced to $1,099,796 and to
$1,025,675' in 1884 . 84 As a result of these cutbacks, pro-
visions for destitute Indians in the North-West Territories
were reduced by almost $80,000 per year between 1882 and 1885 .
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There was a surprising 1La6k of hesitation within the upper
echelons of the government in making this reduction so cruc-
ial to the, state of affairs in the North-West . On September
17th 1883, the Prime Minister wrote to Commissioner Dewdney
that he wanted expenses in the North-West to be kept down as
much as possible, "but still life and property must be pro-
tected" . 86 Dutifully Dewdney made the required reductions
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in his estimates of expenditures for the following year . On
November 17th, Macdonald replied to Dewdney that
[I] am very glad to find that you can begin a
reduction of Indian expenses . Parlt, is sum-
moned for the 17 January 8lnd we hope to make
it a very short session .
Dewdney's willin€ness to reduce expenditures at Macdon-
ald's request, marked a complete reversal from the stand he
had taken two years earlier, when he had warned that although
expenditures would be high the final results of the reserve
farming program would justify them . 88 Perhaps Dewdney be-
lieved that the Indians of the North-West had achieved self-
sufficiency
. If he did he was dead wrong, for that year a
general crop failure occurred in the North-West . 89
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CHAPTER FOUR
HER MAJFSTY'S LOYAL SUBJECTS
The response of Indians in the North-West Territories
to the reserve agricultural program reflected the diversity
of native cultures in that area . . Though faced with the com-
mon problem of adapting to the disappearance of the buffalo
- which in effect meant a more or less complete change in
life style - there was no single or general course followed
by the Indians in making this transition . The dealings f
individual bands and leaders with the government in its re-
serve program were based on widely varying interpretations
of what would be best for their people both in the present
and in the future .
Crowfoot, the head of the Blackfoot Confederacy, pur-
sued a policy of co-operating with the government right
from the signing of the treaties . During the negotiation
of Treaty, Seven in October 1877, Crowfoot expressed his
gratitude for the treatment extended his people by the North-
West Mounted Police, and asked that the government continue
to treat them with kindness .
While I speak be kind and patient . I have
to speak for my people, who are numerous, and
who rely upon me to follow that course which
in the future will tend to their good . The
plains are large and wide . Vie are the people
of the plains, it is our home, and the buffalo
has been our food always . I hope you will
look upon the Blackfeet, Bloods and Sarcees as
your children now, and that you will be
indulgent and charitable to them . They all
expect me to speak now for them, and I trust
the Great Spirit will put into their breasts
to be a good people - into the minds of the
men,, women and children, and their future
generations . The advice given me and my
people has proved to be very good . If the
Police had not come to the country, where
would we all be now? Bad men and whiskey
were killing us so fast that very few, indeed,
of, us would have been left to-day . The Police
have protected us as the feathers of the bird
protect it from the frosts of winter . I wish
them all good, and trust that our hearts will
increase in goodness from this time forwird .
I am satisfied . I will sign the treaty .
Crowfoot's dealings with the government were tempered
with a deep feeling of responsibility for the future of his
people and, an ability to communicate with white officials .
In his first meeting with Dewdney in July of 1879, Crowfoot
greatly impressed the newly appointed Indian Commissioner,
who noted that Crowfoot had spoken "very well, and reason-
ably" . 2 After hearing Dewdney's explanation of the govern-
ment's plans to assist the Indians in undertaking farming
operations, Crowfoot enthusiastically replied, "I will farm ;
this is the first time I have said it ; I mean it, I want to
farm ." 3 At the same time Crowfoot made it clear to Dewdney
that the Blackfoot expected immediate assistance from the
government :
If you will drive away the Sioux and make a
hole so the buffalo can come in we will not
trouble you for f9od . If you don't do that
you must feed us .
He went on to point out that because of his people's starv-
ing condition he was encountering a great deal of
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difficulty in keeping the young men from going to Fort
MacLeod, where he feared they would commit depredations and
kill the ranchers' cattle . Though some of the young men had
ctiticized him for making the Treaty, Crowfoot diplomatically
suggested that now that Dewdney was in the West the govern-
ment would vindicate the stand he had taken with his people .
The Blackfoot spent the next two years hunting buffalo
in the united States ; when they did settle on reserves in
1881 Crowfoot once again stated his readiness to undertake
farming operations provided the Department granted his people
sufficient assistance . In a conference with the Governor-
General in September 1861, Crowfoot opened his comments by
observing that since he had signed the Treaty he had become
poorer and poorer, and was today starving :
I have a good heart . Everyone round here
loves me . I never go anywhere to trouble
people, I remain quiet . Try and help me I
cannot make a living now . I went last year
the other side of the Line [sic], and saw
no buffalo . Help me to keep my, young men
alive . And this petition is as strong as
the ground on which I stand . I cannot get
my ',living now . Hear my prayer .5
Crowfoot requested more liberal rations, explaining that the
people could not live on what they were presently being
granted . 6 In addition, he asked that his people be given
clothing and more agricultural implements . The Governor-
General thanked Crowfoot for having spoken freely to him,
adding that he had "always heard of him as a good chief . . .
even from the time of the treaties" . 7
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While' Crowfoot sought better treatment for his people
through patient co-operation with the government, other
Indian leaders pursued a more militant course of action .
For instance the Cree chief, Poundmaker, who was one of the
most influential leaders in the North-West during the 1880's,
was known in government circles as "a very troublesome Indian", 8
due to his spirited opposition to the Department's economical
administration of the reserve farming program .
Although Poundmaker had been among the first to settle
on a reserve in 1879, he was conversant with the difficulties
involved in becoming a farmer . As early as 1876, during the
negotiation of Treaty Six, he had cautiously pressed the gov-
ernment commissioners for a more detailed statement of what
assistance' the Indians could expect in the future .
From what I can see and hear now, I cannot
understand that I shall be able to clothe
my children and feed them as long as the
sun shines and the water runs . With regard
to the different Chiefs who are to occupy
the reserves, I expect they would receive
sufficient for their support, this is why
I speak . In the presence of God and the
Queen's representative I say this, because
I do not know how to build a house for my
self, you see how naked I am, and if I
tried to do it my naked body would suffer ;
again, I do not know ow to cultivate the
ground for myself' . . .
In the two years after taking a reserve Poundmaker and
his band made considerable progress in breaking land and
constructing buildings, working "like Trojans", their farm-
ing instructor reported
. 10
The government's ration policy, balanced as it was
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between keeping the Indians from starvation on the one hand
and maintaining economy on the other, however, offered scant
encouragement for their efforts . Discouraged with the treat-
ment accorded his people, Poundmaker in the spring of 1881
sent out messengers to different parts of the North-West in-
viting the chiefs to gather in Battleford that summer so they
might press the government for better terms . 11 The bands
settled in the Battleford district refused to seed crops
that year and the agent was told that unless he issued rations
they would take the cattle out on the plains and kill them
for food .
12
Government reaction to the proposed conference and
threats was predictably indecisive . Poundmaker was roundly
denounced as a trouble maker who would have to be shown that
he could not do "exactly as he may please", 13 but in the
end the Department was left hoping that the Governor-
General's tour of the North-West Territories that summer
would quiet the Indians . As a precaution Tiewdney recommended
that a large force of North-West Mounted Police be sent t
Dattleford . 14 In June, Poundmaker and part of his band left
their reserve and headed south to meet with the Indians in
the Cypress Hills, thus relieving the government of the re-
sponsibility of acting
. 15
When the Indians were granted an opportunity to discuss
their grievances with the Governor-General later that summer
Poundmaker forthrightly outlined the difficulties and hard-
ships they, were encountering on the reserves .
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Ever since the white man made the Treaty
the white mar, always talks of how they
are to make their living . I am striving
hard to work on my farm that my children
may benefit but, I am not accustomed to
work on a farm and am short of implements .
I mean the same thing used by the white
men . A reaper, power, that is what we want .
We don't know the use of the flail and when
good crops come we want a thresher . I ask
for this that when my children come of age
they may have learned the use of them . . .
I ask help of the government to assist them
all they can . Vie want animals also . I
hope they will be given now so as to have
enough for the spring . . . Vie cannot work in
the winter . It is cold and we are naked .
There is always much sickness on 1 my reserve
and I would like a Doctor there .
In the fall of 1881 Poundmaker returned to his reserve
and once more energetically engaged himself in farming . 17
Taking this as a sign of submission, the government
largely ignored Poundmaker's requests with the result that
the Indians' grievances remained unsettled . In the summer
of 1883 Poundmaker again left his reserve to speak with
other Indian leaders . 18 Assistant Indian Commissioner Reed
explained Poundmaker's action as part of an effort to make
himself "a great man" in the eyes of other Indians and sug-
gested that he be deposed as chief if he did not set a
better example for his band . 19 The government had no better
understanding of the reasons for Poundmaker's discontent
with reserve life than it had of the Plains Indians' politic-
al structure . An Indian leader could not be "deposed" by
administrative order, for his leadership was based on
the consent of his people, not on the twenty-five dollars
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the Department paid each year to recognize chiefs . The
discontent' expressed by Poundmaker was not that of a mere
self-seeker but the voice of his people .
Whereas Crowfoot and Poundmaker worked to achieve
better terms for their people from within the treaty struct-
ure Big Bear, the Cree chief whom Dewdney considered the
most influential Indian on the Plains 20 chose to remain out-
side the treaty for several years, believing he would in the
end accomplish more in this way . Big Bear did not intend to
place his mark on the treaty when he travelled to Fort Pitt
in September 1876 to meet the government commissioners . 21 He
was familiar with terms of Treaty Four accepted by the Indians
at Qu'Appelle two summers previously and refused to submit
himself to government domination without a guarantee of better
arrangements than were being offered .
22
Big Dear - What we want is that we should
hear what will make our hearts glad and all
good peoples' hearts glad . There were plenty
of things left undone and it does not look
well to leave them so .
Governor - I do not know what has been left
undone .
Big Bear said he would like to see his people
before he acted . "I have told you what I
wish that there be no hanging ."
Governor - What you ask will not be granted .
Why are you so anxious about bad men?
The Queen's law punishes murder with death
and your request cannot be granted .
Big Bear - Then these chiefs will help us to
protect ~4e buffalo that there will be enough
for all .
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The
burden of Big Bear's argument was that if the government
was to be given the power of life or death over the Indians
then it should also be prepared to preserve the buffalo and
to provide' the assistance that his people would require in
future years . Lieutenent-Governor Morris replied to Big Bear
that the government had no intention of interfering with the
Indians' daily life
. It would only help them to make a liv-
ing on the reserves by giving them means of growing their
own food . Nevertheless,
The only occasion when help would be given
would be if Providence would send a great
famine or pestilence upon the whole Indian
people included in the treaty
. We only
looked at somehing unforeseen, and not at
hard winters or the hardships of single
bands . . .
I,orris' reply came nowhere near satisfying the questions
troubling Big Bear's mind .
During the next six years Big Bear remained a non-
treaty Indian, maintaining his struggle for more favour-
able government treatment . His efforts were not in vain, for
as long as he remained on the Plains, demanding more liberal
terms from the government officials who regularly sought his
adhesion to Treaty Six, he demonstrated to those Indians
already settled on reserves that they were not obligated to
meekly surrender their future to the Department of Indian
Affairs .
Nor could the government afford to ignore Big Bear .
Year after year the government persistently sought his adhes-
ion, and with equal persistence Big Bear refused to sign
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unless he was promised more adequate assistance . Meeting
with Lieutenant-Governor Laird at Sounding Lake in August
1878, Big Bear, who acted as a spokesman for both treaty
and non-treaty Indians, reiterated that, the Treaty did not
furnish enough for the people to live upon . 25 In the summer
of 1879, Big Bear held conferences in the southern part of
the territories with both Crowfoot and the Sioux chief,
Sitting Bull . Although a spectacular rumour that Big Bear
and Sitting Bull were planning to fight the North -West
Mounted Police in the Cypress Hills 26 was vigorously denied
by the officer in charge at Fort Walsh, 27 Big Bear was
henceforth known in the Department as not only a troublesome
but, perhaps, even a dangerous Indian .
Between 1879 and 1882, Big Bear and his band travelled
between the Cypress Hills and the Judith Basin in pursuit
of the buffalo . But as the herds dwindled and the Cypress
Hills Indians faced starvation various leaders such as
Piapot, Little Pine and Lucky Man agreed to settle on res-
erves . Finally in December of 1882 Big Bear signed the
treaty and agreed to go north in the spring .
28
It was no
longer possible to remain in the south, and at any rate,
Big Bear's long standing opposition to the reserve agri-
cultural program, as it was administered by the Department,
made it apparent to even the most optimistic government
officers that his "troublesome"nature had not been magic-
ally transformed .
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Although Big Bear and his band moved north in the summer
of 1883 and began receiving rations, this did not mark the
end of his struggle with the government . Big Bear did not
settle on reserve until 1884 . In the meantime he moved
from district to district speaking with different chiefs
about their relations with the government, and discussing
how the government could be forced into offering more assit-
ance . The, Department, took great care in handling the newly
arrived chief, and even broke the "no work, no food" rule in
the case of his band .` 9 Big Bear continued to have the same
unsettling effect upon government administration of the res-
erves as he had had when in the south .
In December 1883, the Department learned that Big Bear
and his cohorts had some undisclosed project in mind, "and
it would not be a source of surprise to find that they are
making efforts to procure a large gathering from east and
west at Battleford or adjacent thereto in the
	
spring in
order to test their powers with the authorities once more" .
3C
Assistant Indian Commissioner Reed advised that the force of
Police in the Saskatchewan district be increased early in the
spring prior to any movement on the part of the Indians, and
that the Department officials be instructed to be among these
Indians continually "in order to endeavour to frustrate any
attempt that might from time to time arise of this nature" . 31
The council which Big Bear was organizing for the summer
of 1884 took on a new significance as the reduction of gov-
ernment expenditures for the North-West began to take effect .
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The integration of the southern Indians into the reserve
agricultural program during the summer of 1883 logically
should have resulted in a proportionally larger Indian ap-
propriation . Instead, a general reduction in costs was
initiated and rations were cut back .
The decision to reduce Indian expenditures in the North-
West resulted from the dictates of a national depression and
the government's longstanding practice of placing economy
above all other considerations in dealing with the Indians .
Although Lawrence Vankoughnet toured reserves in the North
West in the fall of 1883, and reported to the Prime Minister
that more rigid control of spending was required, 32 he did
so knowing; that a general reduction of costs had already
been ordered . The government chose retrenchment in 1883,
but the choice was not inconsistent with its administration
of Indian affairs .
Reaction in the North-West to the reduced rations issues
came swiftly and violently . In February, the farm instruc-
tor at Fort Pitt was threatened at knife point when he re-
fused to grant rations to an Indian who had just returned
from an unsuccessful hunting expedition . 33 In the same ,:month
Indians in the Crooked Lake district of Treaty Four seized
the government storehouse ; their leader, Yellow Calf,report-
edly explained that "When they stole the provisions their
women and children were starving . . . and that they were
well armed and might just as well die as be starved by the
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Government ." 34 A Police patrol sent to the reserve encount-
ered a band of Indians grimly determined to have the food
which they considered to be properly their own, and blood-
shed was only narrowly averted .
35
The Crooked Lakes incident and the threat of further
Indian agitation alarmed Department officials both in Ottawa
and in the North-West . Hayter Reed, the Assistant Indian
Commissioner, informed the Prime Minister that the Indians
would probably congregate in large numbers near Indian Head,
Broadview and Battleford that summer . 36 There would be a
strong inclination, predicted Reed, for the Indians to kill
their cattle if the "no work, no food" rule was imposed .
Reed therefore thought it advisable that every effort be
taken to prevent these gatherings . As a means to this end,
he recommended that some of the ringleaders be arrested :
.e
the law might have to be strained a little
to'meet a particular case, but in the interests
of the country at large as well as the Indians
themselves such a course I think would be
advisable .
A magistrate before whom these Indians might
appear, if at all conversant with Indian cha5lc-
ter could readily discern his proper course .
Reed's evaluation of the urgency of Indian matters in the
Battleford district was not, however, shared by Commissioner
Dewdney, who suggested that these Indians, " only wanted a
little talking to" . 38 Dewdney tended to dismiss rumours
that the proposed council would signal the beginning of
trouble, countering that the Indians of the Battleford and
Carlton districts were working well and were on the whole
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more content than ever before . 39 On the basis of these
conflicting and rather confusing reports from the North-
West, it was decided in Ottawa to adopt a dual policy of
issuing somewhat more liberal rations to those Indians work-
ing on the reserves, while at the same time strengthening
the Mounted Police
. 40
The long awaited Indian Council, which was held in
June 1884 on Poundmaker's reserve, amply demonstrated the
inadequacy' of this policy as a means for keeping the Indians
working on the reserves, let alone le-t
	
e satisfying their
demands
. In the course of the joint Sun Dance - council the
matter of ration policy emerged accidentally and almost ended
in pitched battle between the Northwest Mounted Police and
the assembled Indians
. An incident sparked by the assault of
a farming instructor who refused to grant provisions to a
member of Lucky Man's band - according to the Department's
rule -
resulted in a tense confrontation between the Indians
and a party of Police and volunteers sent out from Battleford
to arrest the offender . Except for the efforts of Big Bear
and several other chiefs to avoid trouble the show-down would
almost certainly have sparked the massacre of the Police
party . 41
The government unfortunately interpreted the affair
not as an outright rejection of its policy but rather as a
warning that some modifications were needed
. The practice of
feeding Indians only in return for work performed, Vankough-
net informed Dewdney, had "worked most satisfactorily" and
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therefore there was no reason for it being changed . 42 What
the government did resolve to change was its method of deal-
ing with such incidents . It would not again be caught in
the position of having to face a large body of discontented
Indians with an inadequate force of police . 43
Because of the ration incident and the hot-headed re-
action of the young man, the Battleford Council failed to
produce a program for planned political agitation . Never-
theless, Big Bear persevered in his efforts to unite the
Indians of the North-West in opposition to the government s
administration of the reserve agricultural program . A good
deal was accomplished by the Indians in this direction in
July of 1884 when Big Bear and chiefs in the Carlton district
met with the Pvetis leader, Louis Riel .
The Duck Lake Council marked a crucial stage in the
development of a unified Indian political movement in the
North-West . During the course of the Council Big Bear out-
lined the reason for their unrest in a simple but passionate
explanation : the Indians had surrendered their lands and
settled on reserves in response to the government's promise
that they would achieve a better way of life through farming ;
the government had not kept its promise and therefore a new
and more generous settlement would have to be negotiated .
44
It was also agreed that a council including bands from every
section of the North-West would meet the following summer
to demand better terms from the government . 45
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The Duck Lake Council exposed the difficulty of integ-
rating the Indian and Metis political movements . Tradition-
al antipathy between . the two peoples and differing political
aims made it unlikely that they would co-operate effectively
in dealing with the government . The Metis' claims against
the federal' government revolved around the question of land
rights, for they resented being treated as homesteaders . To
the Indians these grievances seemed unimportant compared to
their own struggle to obtain enough to eat . The Council there-
fore ended without anything more than general statements of
sympathy being exchanged between the Indians and Riel .
46
Both the Department of Indian Affairs and the North-
West Mounted Police anxiously awaited reports of the proceed-
ings at Duck Lake . 47 While the Agent at Battleford reported
that in fourteen years of experience in Indian Affairs he
had never before seen the Indians so intent upon a course,
48
Commissioner Dewdney played down the significance of the
Council . With complete disdain for the political movement
which Big Bear was nurturing Dewdney predicted in a letter
to the Prime Minister that an attempt might be made the next
summer to re-negotiate the treaties - "If the Half-Breeds
don't get what they want" .
49
He went so far as to suggest
that if work was found for the Metis in railway construction,
grievances in the North-West would disappear .
50
If Dewdney's reaction to Big Bear's activities was char-
acterized by disdain, his opinion of Crowfoot's efforts dur-
ing the summer of 1884 barely fell short of utter contempt .
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Crowfoot and several other chief's from Treaty Seven travelled
to Regina in July in order to present the Commissioner with
various requests . In particular they asked that the flour
ration not be further reduced . 51 Although Dewdney confid-
entially noted that these Indians had "no substantial griev-
ances" 52 he elected to appease Crowfoot through a number of
inexpensive but impressive measures . Crowfoot visited the
North-;"best Territorial Council in session and was awarded
fifty dollars by the Council "as a mark of the esteem in which
his nation is held" . 53 The Blackfoot chiefs were also taken
to Winnipeg on the newly constructed railway in an effort to
demonstrate to them "the supremacy of the white man and the
utter impossibility of contending against his power" . 5 4 The
ultimate solution proposed by Dewdney to meet ration griev-
ances in Treaty Seven was that greater allowances of tea
and tobacco', be issued to working Indians . In any case,
Lewdney believed the cost of the tea could be made up by
corresponding reduction from some other ration and still
meet with approval of the Indians" . 55
The rations issued in Treaty Seven, nonetheless continued
to be entirely inadequate, as less than five ounces of flour
per day was provided each Indian . 56 When Crowfoot complained
about the flour ration to Inspector W'adsworth his efforts were
attributed to a desire "to show off before his Indians and to
show that his trip east had not destroyed his powers of speak-
ing out" . 5 7 Moreover, as nobody else had complained about
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the rations it was assumed that there
was no real problem .
An unusual calm fell over Indian administration in the
North West following the turbulent summer of 1884 . Although
there had been a total crop failure in the North-West that
year, the autumn annuity payments were carried off without
difficulty . It appeared that Dewdney's analysis had been
correct, that there was nothing to fear from the Indians as
long as the half-breeds were quiet . Nevertheless, the De-
partment received numerous warnings during the winter of
1884-1885 that a settlement with the Indians and Metis people
should be sought without delay .
The Indian Agent at Carlton wrote that while it was
not for him to question the government' policy of economy,
it should be recognized that a crucial period lay ahead in
which Indian discontent would predominate . 58 In a letter to
Dewdney, a settler in the Prince Albert district strongly
urged that the TMMZetis' claims be settled quickly as uncertain-
ty and disquietude was deterring homesteaders from entering
the district . 59 Superintendent Crozier of the Mounted Police
reported to his commissioner that a settlement should be made
without delay, "for as long as these questions concerning'the
Half-Breeds are left unsettled so long will there be uneasi-
ness, not only among themselves but the Indians as well"
.60
These' warnings and reports that the Blackfoot were
being invited to participate in the Indian Council plan-
ned for the summer of 1885 61 did not move the government to
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arrange a settlement or even enter into negotiations with
the Indians and. Metis . Macdonald did not believe that the
situation was likely to clear up easily, for, as he stated,
"no amount of concession will prevent starving people from
grumbling and agitating " . 62 Instead, the Prime Minister
made up his mind to request that parliament increase the
size of the North West Mounted Police Force . 63
In February 1885, the Indian Commissioner reported to
Macdonald that Indian matters had been generally quiet .
Although he had heard "rumours" about an Indian gathering
to be held at Duck Lake Dewdney put little faith in these
reports for the Indians lacked both the ponies and the pro-
visions to undertake such a journey . 64 While a few might go
there he anticipated no trouble . Towards the end of this
letter Dewdney noted that "Last year was a very dishearten-
ing one for the Indians and it will be necessary (in the
spring) . . . to encourage them to fresh exertions ."
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Neither Dewdney's hope for "fresh exertions" among the
Indians nor Big Bear's long awaited Indian Council for the
renegotiation of the treaties were realized in 1885 . On
March 26th a patrol of policemen and armed volunteers from
Prince Albert was engaged in battle by Metis riflemen near
Duck Lake and ter men from the government side were killed .
One week later warriors belonging to Big Bear's band mas-
sacred Agent Quinn and eight other white men at Frog Lake .
"Even as the old chief rushed forward shouting at his young
men to stop their bloody work he must have realized that his
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ten year struggle to prevent the complete subjugation of his
people had been in vain ."
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The most remarkable aspect of Indian participation in
the North-West Uprising of 1885 was that it was so limited ..
Apart from the Frog Lake Massacre and the battle fought be-
tween government farces and Poundmaker's band at Cut Knife
Hill, Indian depredations were restricted to reserves in
the Battleford district where two farming instructors were
murdered . In both the Battleford and Carlton districts
a number of bands left their reserves, and killed their
cattle for food . Yet, in view of the unrest that had pre-
vailed among the Indians of the North-West the previous
summer, the government should have considered itself fort-
unate indeed that there- was no general Indian uprising .
Government reaction to Indian involvement in the rising
was swift and vindictive . Eight Indians convicted of murder
hanged at Fort Battleford, and Big Bear and Poundmaker
sentenced to prison terms at Stoney Mountain Penitent
in Manitoba .
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Moreover during the summer and fall of
the Department considered a number of proposals for the
future management of Indian affairs in the North-West Terri-
tories . A memorandum submitted to Dewdney by Assistant Indian
Commissioner Reed was especially illustrative of the repress-
ive stance assumed by the Department . 68 While Reed believed
that all Indians who had not been disloyal or troublesome
during, the rising should be treated as they had been pre-
viously, he had little sympathy for "rebellious Indians" :
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Indian rebels whom it is found possible
to convict of particular crimes such as
instigating and inciting arson, larceny,
murder etc ., [should] be dealt with in as
severe a manner as the law will allow, and
. no offences of their most prominent men
[should] be overlooked . 69
In addition Reed urged that agents should be particularly
strict in seeing that each and every Indian worked for
"every pound of provision given to him" . 70 "All future grants
should be regarded as concessions of favour not of right, and
the rebel Indians [should] be made to understand that they
have forfeited every claim as a 'matter of right' ."71
While Dewdney and Vankoughnet generally agreed with the,
tenor of Reed's memorandum, both recognized the danger in-
volved in pressing such a line too far at that time .7 2 In an
effort to calm the Indians, a policy of rewarding 'loyal
Indians' was adopted, and blankets, cattle and ponies, which
had been confiscated from rebel Indians, were distributed
among those who had distinguished themselves during the rising
73by inaction .
	
But the most telling sign of the government's
willingness to guard against further trouble was the increase
of the Indian appropriation for the North-West . In 1886 the
appropriation returned to the level it had been at in 1882 .
7
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Although expenditures in Treaties Four, Six and Seven fell off
sharply in the late 1880's it must be noted that this was
largely a result of a sizeable drop in population . In 1889
there were 14,456 Indians on reserves in the three treaties . 75
-'yen more alarming was the ratio of 41 .71 births per thousand
as compared to a death
rate of 46 .38 . 76
Given a declining
native population, it was relatively easy to maintain economy
in Indian administration . In the end, the government's
bumbling administration which blended ignorance with a will-
ingness to exercise repression, proved adequate to handle the
Indian problem .
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The disappearance of the buffalo from the North-West
Territories in 1878-1879 had forced the Canadian government
to feed the Indians of Treaties Four, Six and Seven . While
the government had been morally obligated to such a course
by the terms of the treaties, its plans for the development
of the North-West made it essential that amicable relations
be maintained with the native population . There was, never-
theless, some hesitation among both Conservative and Liberal
politicians in undertaking this responsibility, for the ex-
pense involved in feeding the Indians was large . The govern-
ment, therefore, initiated the reserve agricultural program
by which it was hoped that the Indians would in a few years
be converted into self-sufficient farmers .
Although considerable progress was achieved in this
direction during the early 1880's the reserve agricultural
policy, did not meet this objective . Lack of knowledge about
the kinds of crops and agricultural practices best suited to
the prairie climate rendered farming difficult, even for the
Department's white farming instructors . But the greatest ob-
stacle in the way of the reserve agricultural program was the
government's willingness to place considerations of economy
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above all else . As a result the administration of the farm-
ing program in the North-West was almost from the beginning
plagued with inconsistencies and the pursuit of what proved
to be false economies did little to encourage the Indians .
The depression which began in 1882 spelled the final failure
of the program, for in the following year massive reductions
were made in Indian expenditures for the North-West . Indians
who were fed so little that they remained in a constant state
of hunger could not become self-sufficient farmers .
Government retrenchment in 1883 merely added fuel to
the smouldering Indian discontent with the treatment they
were receiving from the Department of Indian Affairs . Though
different chiefs used different tactics in seeking better
terms for their people, the organization of Indian councils
advocated by Big Bear was potentially the most effective .
Had a conference of chiefs from all sections of the North-
Vest been held in 1885, it seems likely that the government
would have been forced to make concessions to such a unified
Indian political movement . The government, however, was not
prepared to negotiate with the Indians, and replied by streng-
thening the Police . The Indians were fully aware of their
helplessness in the face of such determined indifference ; it
was no mistake that only a few of the young hot-heads rose
in the spring of 1885 .
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